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Stephan Bühnen has applied some of my ideas to a wider region than
southwestern Mali, and shown that the principles of Mande status discourse
make possible new interpretations on sources and political processes in the
entire West African Sudan. Inspired by Bühnen's analysis, I am convinced that
the principles of Mande status discourse may shed light on various processes,
varying from political struggles between families to the construction of
contemporary ethnic identities. I hope that this reply will not be the end of the
discussion on West African genealogies, and that others will join us.
Although Bühnen ideas are fruitful, there are also points to contest. Lack
of space forces me to focus on three points of Bühnen's critique: the way I
elaborate the term "segmentary;" his remarks that I overlook a "bulk of
testimony recorded in medieval Arabic sources;" and his complaint of my
"inadequate understanding of historical politics."
Since Bühnen accepts my analysis of the Mande genealogies and their
relation to nineteenth-century society, I will take this as my point of
departure. I will argue that we cannot deduce the "historical reality of politics"
for the available material without being misled by our own prejudices and
fallacies. The 'old' sources are not as one-dimensional as Bühnen thinks: a
status claim does not necessarily represent an irreversible hierarchy in a
relationship. Bühnen ignores the context, overlooks the dynamics of Mande
status discourse, and presupposes his model of chiefdoms.
I admit that I am vague about the way I operationalize the term
"segmentary," but a definition of "segmentary" is not necessary to my
argument since I focus on a discourse which shows that any relation in Mande
is hierarchical as well as based on a dichotomy—for instance, 'older-younger'
or 'founder-stranger.' However, when discussing typologies—Mali as a
segmentary society? Mande as an empire?—it may be necessary to elaborate
the term "segmentary," and I accept Bühnen's definition/description:
On the level of the society the term 'segmentary' designates the
fragmentation into structurally equivalent descent groups. Although
this type of segmentation does not preclude poliücal inequality, the
term has vmfortunately come to be employed as a synonym for
'politicalh, uncentralized,' and more particularly for societies with a
unitary genealogy and an "equilibrium" of lineages.
When I write "segmentary society" then, I refer to a society with structurally
equivalent (descent) groups, without precluding political inequality.
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A status claim cannot be taken as evidence for a long-lasting relationship.
According to Bühnen I "neglect" the bulk of testimony. I disagree, but
suppose that any testimony on relationships in Mande is problematical as a
historical source, since the context and the informant are unknown. Any
outsider who nowadays visits Mande is often welcomed with words like "an bè
kelen" ("we are one") and "fa kelen, ba kelen" ("[we have] the same father and
the same mother"). The outsider traveling from town to town will find peace
and unity along the way. Mande has been a relatively peaceful place to travel
for individuals for ages; travelers like Park and Caillié and Vallière never had
major problems in Mande, even though they were told stories of conflicts, and
sometimes witnessed war.'
Once acquainled with local conditions and traditions, the traveler will
acquire more and more data about tensions between social groups, but will not
see the 'logic' of these tensions. Although the griots have applied this 'logic'
for a long time, generations of scholars have overlooked it, probably because
of their Obsession with the image of an empire.
Early travelers who visited Mande were merchants who traveled as
individuals: both the Arabs and the early Europeans were most interested in
trade. Of course they experienced effective control, but this says nothing about
the nature of rule, except that society provided such effective control during
these periods. It is a fallacy, however, to suppose that effective control is
possible only in combination with centralized authority. The Arabs were not
able to understand the nature of Mande society, because, as Bühnen notes, they
were "members of a despotic society." Neither the Arabs nor the French
understood the dynamics of social action in Mande, and their observations
must be analyzed with caution.
As a result, our image of a disintegrating Mali empire is merely the
product of the kinds of data available. Only after the collection of many data
was Mande considered to be the remnants of an empire. In short, I argue fhat
Bühnen's description of "a historical shift from the imperial area to a Situation
of constant rivalry" is unproven.
The problem is not only that Mande is relatively peaceful, and that
superficial contact with the people leads to the impression that the Mande
people are one great family. Also problematic for our Interpretation is the fact
that in Mande power is represented in claims giving authority to the older, in
combination with a possible inversion of role and perspective.
Bühnen himself illustrates the problem. Discussing the relationship
between Jalomansa and Mandimansa, he presupposes a provenance for nis
Information in order to make an Interpretation of various sources. In doing so
he ignores the dynamics of a relationship between an older and younger
brother: the older can accept the leadership by the younger because both know
the temporary character of this leadership: both the two descent groups/persons
involved will state that the younger brother acts on the orders of the older
brother, and thus Jalomansa's keletigi status does not necessarily signal
Subordination.
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The younger brother's status of leader is precisely the guarantee and the
condition for political hierarchy within a society with structurally equivalent
descent groups. Every social action is the result of a contextualized
Interpretation of a hierarchical relationship. Mande society thus seems
ambiguous on a textual level, and traditions will never provide ultimate
answers. Mande is a whirlpool of status claims, in which power is established
by attributing authority to others in order to continue both hierarchies and
segments.
Let me illustrate inversion of the representation of social relations from
the Haut-Niger.2 In Kangaba the Keita are rulers, and the Traore, together with
the Camara, the founders. These Traore are politically unimportant; Leynaud
and Cisse complain that this group does even not know its own genealogy. In
Balanzan, a town 18 kilometers from Kangaba and less powerful man
Kangaba, the rulers are Traore, who claim to have arrived after the Keita, in
order to help Sunjata. Giving this contradiction on a textual level, Leynaud
and Cisse conclude that there must be two Traore groups: a minor group
descending from the original population of the Haut-Niger, and an important
group descending from immigrants "after Sunjata."
Such a 'historical' reconstruction is a mistake; these stories have nothing
to do with migrations. They merely show the principles of Mande status
discourse: recent arrival is claimed within the limits of the sphere of influence
of the Balanzan Traore. However, in relation to the Keita of Kangaba the
Traore accept the inverted position. Leynaud and Cisse took the claim by the
Balanzan Traore at face value because they spent most of their time in
Kenyegue, a village "controlled" by Balanzan. Had they worked in Kangaba,
they would have written a different history.
This case may illustrate the importance of the Sunjata epic in Mande
society. Descent groups with the same patronymic represent their relation in
genealogies, and prestigieus descent groups of different patronymics represent
their relation by focusing on the sequence of arrival or other traditions about
cooperation such as the Sunjata epic. For the Haut-Niger version of the
Sunjata epic—the Kela version—I elaborated this idea by pointing to the
anomalous position of the ancestors of the Diabate, Kouyate, and Diawara
when compared other versions of the epic.3 The Sunjata epic is a contemporary
status discourse, and the stability of the tradition in the Haut-Niger is evidence
for stability in society. Bühnen remarks that "the Sunjata epic retains in its
narrative the perspective of an empire." I would put it much stronger: the
Sunjata epic establishes unity and hierarchy between structurally equivalent
descent groups by pi'oviding the image of an empire.
If positions ip status claims invert so vividly, we need a great number of
such stories to reconstruct relationships among descent groups. We do not
know the exact place of origin of the written sources on which medieval and
post-medieva) West African history has been based. Consequently, we cannot
take any of our sources on relations between rulers as evidence for the actual
relations between regions: that would be far too speculative.
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Given this context dependence of any source in Mande, and if one accepts
my analysis of nineteenth-century Mande and of modern oral tradition, one
cannot transform the principles of a "Mande status discourse" into a historical
scenario of territorially-based polities whose kings represented themselves äs
younger brothers in relation to rivals and äs older brothers in relation to
subordinates. Therefore, Bühnen's mechanical Interpretation of genealogies is
unacceptable.41 do not ignore the Arab sources, as Bühnen says, but think that
it is impossible to use them äs evidence for the existence of polities äs defined
by Bühnen.
In mentioning territorially-based polities I come to a major point of
critique in Bühnen's analysis. He wrongly presupposes that in West Africa
control was over land. In fact, control was over people, and therefore in terms
of relationships. There were ideas about land and fertility, but land was not a
medium to control in general. In answer to Bühnen's critique of my alleged
"inadequate understanding of historical polities," I will work out this idea.
Bühnen's evidence for control over land is too meager: it comes from a
few data collected by Dieterlen and from data from other parts of Africa. I agree
with Bühnen that through a cult of the anceslors (kinsmenü) a descent group
"maintains the bond with...the land, providing fertility and prosperity for the
descent group." However, there is no reason to think that this has something
to do with control over land, even when the descent group is powerful.
Leynaud and Cisse state that every lineage in the Haut-Niger held fields since
ancient times, and celebrated ceremonies on it to obtain a good harvest. There
was no tradition of control over land in the Haut-Niger, and this may be
precisely the reason why the French had so many difficulties when they tried
to rule cantons äs territorial units.5
There is no evidence that ceremonial practices of fertility or ancestors
existed on a 'chiefdom' level. Although spheres of influence existed from the
perspective of any descent group, there was no control over land. Mande did
not have a tradition of territorial rule, only of rule by tribule, that is,
recognition of a hierarchical relationship. The existence of earth priests
(dugukolotigiw) is no argument for the existence of any kind of control over
land. Bühnen leaves open the possibility that the village earth priests may
have been the former village owners, since they are represented as the
descendants of the founder. As I have argued elsewhere, the status of founder is
largely a representation of inferiority in relation to the village chief in the
context of inter-village politics.6 Within the village the position of earth priest
as descendant of the founder is a guarantee to limit the leadership of the village
chief, a descendant of the family who arrived as 'the last,' the 'younger
brother.'
Much speculation on the territorial dimension of rulership is inspired by a
'mysterious' septennial ceremony in the Kamabolon, the sacred hut in
Kangaba. It is necessary to elaborate on this idea, lest others argue that I have
overlooked this evidence. Due to Dieterlen's work this ceremony is often
considered to be evidence for the link between earth ownership and the power
of the 'mansa.' Although this image of the Kamabolon is widely accepted, it
POUTIES AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE 125
is in fact nonsense. In the Kamabolon the Sunjata epic—clearly a political
story on relationships—is told, and not some kind of creation myth.7
We have no idea just how Dieterlen collected her fieldwork data.8 I think,
though, that she confused two themes in the Mande world: fertility and
politics. She was a pioneer in Mande research and we are much indebted much
to her work. Just the same, it is odd that so many scholars still accept the
opinion that creation myths are told inside the Kamabolon, even while no
researcher has ever been allowed to attend the ceremonies in the hut.
Bühnen uses too limited an interpretation of "lineage." Thus hè states that
the king secured his hold over his territory by perpetuating numerical
supremacy through making many women pregnant. This ignores not only
processes of adoption, but also the political and ideological dimension of any
descent group in Mande.: unity within a descent group is not perpetuated by
numerical majority, but by the belief in common descent within a group.
Status is represented in terms of kinship, and therefore kinship constructions
are often artificial when compared to biological kinship.
Those in power represented themselves as members of one and the same
descent group in relation to others, and a certain image of hereditary kingship
was attributed to those 'rulers' within a certain region. Those who accepted
these rulers did not care how those rulers chose a successor within their descent
group, because that was not their business. Therefore the one who fïnally
became the new mansa would certainly have argued—at least within his
'descent group'—that hè is the oldest, and thus the legitimate successor.9
Kinship terminology was both the condition and the result of any
relationship. Still, nowadays in the Haut-Niger economically flourishing
lineages attract presumed 'members' from far away: kinship terminology is a
solid ground for the construction of continuity in a lineage. Moreover,
researchers, and other outsiders, can do fieldwork only if they accept a Mande
patronymic, thereby opening the possibility for kinship relations.
Bühnen ignores the omnipresence of kinship in West Africa, and wrongly
states that "in a mainly pedestrian society communication maintaining kin
sentiments and kin control is spatially restricted." On the contrary, I would
argue that society was represented m terms of kinship: relationships were
expressed in terms of "kin sentiments." This was not "spatially restricted:"
they have always been produced in the Sudan any moment that people
cooperated or conflicted. The idea that chiefdoms do not exceed fifty kilometers
is therefore merely a product of Bühnen's model; kinship sentiments are
where relations are, and hierarchy is where kinship is.
The non-existence of an earth cult—as a sign of attachment to a territory
or rule over a territory—and the omnipresence of kinship terminology
undermine the crux of Bühnen's historical scenario for the evolution in which-
-as Bühnen writes—"the notion of pyramidal structures overcomes the concept
of a direct step from 'segmentary society' to the 'state' through an intentional
process of 'state building'. The latter concept ignores the basic module in the
construction of larger politics: the chiefdom." Bühnen's chiefdom has never
existed in Mande, nor are there convincing data to accept his model as an ideal
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type. Relations were constructed and reproduced in relation to ever-changing
sociohistorical and political contexts, and thus status representations needed to
be open to Inversion in perspective. A single source is not sufficient to use as
evidence for any relationship whatesoever in Mande.
In Mande power and authority are defined in terms of relationships. This
is why the older sources and oral traditions deal with ambassadors and with
tribute regulations between villages, towns, and leading families. However,
there is no example of processes of total subjection, nor examples of total
autonomy. Bühnen writes that I am analyzing only "special relationships."
True enough, but only because other kinds of relations cannot exist in Mande:
"total mutual independence" and "lasting subjection" are sociological
categories which are empty regarding relations between families in Mande, or
maybe even regarding any individual or group in the entire Sudan.
The sources on Mande history refer to a political discourse, and not
necessarily to the evolution of polities. Since status claims are expressed in
terms of relations and relations in terms of status claims, one cannot
automatically interpret a story on a 'division' or 'conflict' as evidence for a
momentum in the evolution of a type of society, because conflict and
harmony are characteristics of the same relation between 'brothers.' Discussing
the divisions in the Mali empire, as described in the Ta'rikh as-Sudan,
Bühnen writes: "These were uneasy times." Why? Society was represented in
terms of hierarchical kinship relations, and thus in terms of rivalry, but this
does not prove uneasy times. The evidence for the alleged uneasy times in the
alleged polities actually consists of the products of a political discourse on
status within hierarchical relationships.
Mande polities cannot be defined as territorial units, and Bühnen's
historical scenario for the evolution of polities must be seriously doubted by
lack of evidence. Control is not over land, but over people, which is why
those in power represent themselves in terms of hierarchical relations.
Different contexts may demand different orientations in relation to the same
group. Relations are in terms of kinship, and thus any relation is both a model
for harmony and a model for rivalry and conflict. That is the main principle in
the political discourse on status. The nineteenth-century history of the Haut-
Niger proved that alleged conflict between 'older' and 'younger' was actually
often the basis for solid cooperation.10
Mande was a "segmentary society" in Bühnen's definition, since any
descent group was represented as structurally equivalent, by attributing
seniority to the temporary inferior. This representation of a relationship was
the only way to interfere with other people's business or, conversely, to
cooperate.
For the period before 1800 those in power along the Niger represented
themselves in terms of kinship relations and in positions in genealogies. The
complexity of such a discourse in nineteenth-century Mande misled both
French administrators and many historians, although there was effective rule
by Kangaba, and its status was widely acknowledged. Therefore I argued that in
the study of the history of West African society the pre-1800 sources must be
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treated with caution. These refer to a status discourse in Mande politics, and
not necessarily to real relationships in which the oldest represented legitimate
right to succession of power.
Every relation is a story and that story is valid only in a certain context.
Because Mande was more effectively organized in the nineteenth Century than
has been thought until recently, and because orally transmitted genealogies
appear to be more tricky than has been thought until recently, the histoncal
shift from the alleged Mali empire to Mande segmentary society may be no
more than a barner created by scholars.
Buhnen stated: "No, the Mali empire did not exist in the nineteenth
Century." I agree with this statement, but on different grounds entirely. Given
the amount of contemporary sources compared to the relatively scarce
testimonies from the preceding period, given the nature of these sources as part
of a political discourse, and given Person's statement that 'the past' can be
analyzed only by means of oral tradition when the 'present' is taken as a point
of departure, I conclude with a question which is a transformation of the earlier
title.11 Although this question may challenge many of the categories of
conventional wisdom on West Afncan history, this formulation is
methodologically the only correct question: "Was Mande already a segmentary
society in the Middle Ages?"
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